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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
of fiduciary duty imposed on the agent by holding that a substantial dis-
crepancy between the contract price and the value of the property was
sufficient, alone, to rebut the claim of the agent that he had disclosed all
material facts.
HUGH ALLAN Ross
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Violations of Canons of Professional Ethics
We have commented in a previous survey article' upon the Supreme
Court's determination that it is unethical for an attorney to conceal from
the probate court before which he is acting as administrator and attorney
for the administrator of an estate being administered therein, the fact that
he also is representing a principal claimant to the proceeds of such estate
and has a contract with such claimant for a percentage of the recovery for
that claimant.
Pursuant to the recently adopted procedures for discipline of attor-
neys in this State, the case again came before the Supreme Court during
the period covered by this survey.2 Several issues were raised, of which
one is particularly relevant: whether the rule of the court under which
the disciplinary proceedings were -brought is constitutional? The court,
quite rightly we think, held that the rule is constitutional; reiterated that
the power to admit to practice and to discipline those who have been
admitted to the bar is inherently within the powers of the judicial branch
of the government and may not be limited or directed by the legislative
branch; that the reference under Rule XXVII of disciplinary matters to a
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline is solely for in-
vestigation purposes, not for judgments, and that the facts in the case did
not present the question whether the Rule violated Section 1, Article IV
of the State Constitution3 in bypassing the inferior courts.
The high court does not appear to have passed, and expressly indi-
cated in 'its opinion that it was not so passing, upon the power of local
bar associations, through their grievance and disciplinary procedures, to
1. 1956 Survey, 8 WEST. RES. L REV. 250 (1957).
2. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Pleasant, 167 Ohio St. 325, 148 N.E.2d 493 (1958)
Cert. denied, ____ U.S. ___ (1959). This is apparently the first decision by the
Supreme Court under its new procedures for discipline, since it bears the notation,
"D.D. No. 1."
3. "The judicial power of the State is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals,
courts of common pleas, courts of probate, and such other courts inferior to the courts
of appeals as may from time to time be established by Law."
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issue at least private reprimands to offending practitioners, 4 nor does it
appear to have foreclosed entirely a disciplinary power of inferior courts.
In Lattin v. McMiller& the Stark County Court of Appeals decided, one
day before the Supreme Court's pronouncement, that a common pleas
court -has a similar inherent right, upon proper application or sua sponte,
and without the help of any specific statutory provisions, to conduct a
general investigation as to unauthorized practice of law within its juris-
diction; that the court need not personally conduct such investigation
but has similar inherent power to appoint trusted and qualified com-
mittees or commissioners.
The two cases are dearly not in conflict. A head-on conflict will
occur if and when formal disciplinary proceedings against persons ad-
mitted to practice are commenced independently of Rule XXVII in a
common pleas court or a court of appeals.
Violation of Canons of Judicial Ethics
The Supreme Court also passed upon another disciplinary matter of
importance to us as officers of the court, this time involving the Canons
of Judicial Ethics.6 These Canons, of course, are much newer in time
than the Canons of Professional Ethics,7 and have received far less judicial
interpretation. In Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Franko, the court had
before it original disciplinary proceedings, instituted under its new rules
XXVII and XXVIII against respondent, a lawyer and, during the time
of the acts by him which were the subject of complaint, a judge of the
Youngstown Municipal Court.
The opinion of the Supreme Court, though quite lengthy, is thorough,
well considered and the source of much valuable authority and quotation
for lawyers concerned with problems of professional and judicial ethics.
The court found as facts that:
1. Respondent had failed and refused while an active partisan candi-
date for the political office of county prosecutor to resign his inferior
judicial position in violation of Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
2. He had openly campaigned for the office of municipal judge,
making a significant part of his campaign the repeated promises that
4. 167 Ohio St 325, 335, 148 N.E.2d 493, 499 (1958).
5. 104 Ohio App. 449, 150 N.E.2d 84 (1958).
6. Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 151 N.E.2d 17 (1958).
See also, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW section, infra.
7. The Canons of Professional Ethics were first adopted by the American Bar As-
sodation on July 9, 1924; the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics of the American Bar Association on November 13, 1952 and Canons
of judicial Ethics on January 27, 1954. See 167 Ohio St. lxxxiv.
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as judge he would not strictly follow the provisions of state statutes re-
quiring the notation of traffic law violations upon the licenses of con-
victed drivers, in violation of Canon 30.
3. He had persistently disregarded, while judge, duty assignments
made pursuant to statute and rule of court by the presiding judge of
the Youngstown Municipal Court by holding traffic court on Saturday
mornings (although he was not the regularly assigned traffic judge and
Saturday was not ordinarily a day upon which traffic cases or other
matters were heard by any of the other judges); during hearings he
carried out his previously announced policy of not marking the drivers'
licenses of persons convicted of traffic law violations; voided, for no
valid reason whatsoever, some 720 duly issued parking-violation tickets,
and arbitrarily assessed a standard penalty of five dollars and suspended
costs for all traffic violations.
4. He published and distributed some 85,000 copies of a standard-size
newspaper, entitled "The Political News," in which he caused himself to
be referred to innumerable times as "Judge Franko," and wrote letters re-
questing support in his campaign for the office of county prosecutor, in
which, in those to Democrats, he claimed affiliation with the donkey
and in those to Republicans, with the elephant.
Respondent's defense to the charges outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3
was that he was merely exercising his "judicial discretion." The Su-
preme Court cogently disposed of this effort by pointing out that there
was a significant distinction between the occasional and even common
exercise of that undoubted duty and the constant use of it as a cloak in
furtherance of general political ambitions.8
As a matter of law on the facts above, and others found by it, the
Supreme Court held (following the paradoxically named Pleasant case)
that Rule XXVII is not at variance with statutory procedures for disbar-
ment, that it did not deprive respondent of due process or operate uncon-
stitutionally against him, since it in fact afforded him a hearing before
the Supreme Court before any punitive action was taken against him, and
finally that acts committeed by an attorney in his capacity as a judge are
grounds for his discipline qua attorney, in that such acts are done by him
as a member of the bar under color of his other office which he holds for
the time being. The Canons of Professional Ethics are binding upon all
members admitted to practice Law in Ohio, as are the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.x0 Rule XXVII, Sections 1, 5 and 6, relating to the investigation
of conduct and the enforcement of discipline, specifically refer to both
8. Canon 21, Canons of Judicial Ethics.
9. Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Pleasant, 167 Ohio St. 325, 148 N.E.2d 493 (1958).
10. OHMO Sup. CT. R. XXVIII.
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